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SPRING 2019 CISG CONFERENCE AT
PITT: KEYNOTE ADDRESS
THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE CISG (AND OTHER
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAW INITIATIVES)
Harry M. Flechtner*

I. THE PAST (A PERSONAL NARRATIVE)
It is a genuine, and doubtless undeserved, honor that I am the keynote
speaker for a conference featuring such an amazing line-up of participants.
As far as I remember (which I admit is not that far—I’m old), I have never
before been a keynote speaker for any conference. That, of course, reflects
good sense on the part of conference organizers. But the usual great sense of
my extraordinary colleague, buddy, and organizer of this conference—Ron
Brand—apparently is clouded by our thirty-five year long friendship. So here
I am. Of course, I still think of keynote speakers from my usual perspective
as not one: a keynote speaker is the person who spoils dessert. [That, by the
way, has no application to anyone in this room who has keynoted a
conference in which I have participated.] I will probably spoil dessert—
perhaps the only “keynote-speaker” requirement I will tick off—but as you
know, I retired last summer, so I can no longer be fired. Not having a job is
wonderful job security. That emboldens me to say some stuff that I believe,
but cannot support in the usual scholarly fashion. You will do me and others
a great favor by pointing out the errors and stupidity of what I say.

*
Professor Flechtner is Professor Emeritus at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and a
National Correspondent for the United States at the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law.

Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.173 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu
35

36

JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 38:35

The appearance of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods as
a proposed UN Convention, following the successful diplomatic conference
in Vienna in March and April 1980, no doubt was greeted with great interest
and, at least among supporters of the effort, great enthusiasm. I cannot
personally report on that reception because I was still in law school at that
time, and I heard nothing about it. I would not encounter the CISG until seven
years later, when a certain Professor Ronald Brand convinced me—a
domestic commercial law academic hired by the University of Pittsburgh just
three years earlier to teach U.S. federal bankruptcy law—to participate in a
conference on this commercial law convention I had never heard of. I am an
exceedingly generous guy: I have forgiven him.
When I started studying the CISG for that December 1987 conference—
a conference held just one month before the CISG would enter into force in
the United States and the ten other original Contracting States—I quickly
caught the enthusiasm for this instrument. For someone who had been
teaching Article 2 of the UCC, which has the same basic purpose and strategy
as the CISG (although in a domestic—or more accurately federalist—
context), the transition was relatively easy. That was true even for me, even
though I had no actual international credentials whatsoever. It helped that it
was soon apparent that the scholarly challenges presented by this Convention
were many and varied, ranging from the minutiae (often critical minutiae, for
parties involved in litigation) of interpreting individual articles of the
Convention, to extraordinarily broad questions, such as how to promote
uniform interpretation of a text being applied by arbitral panels and nonspecialist courts around the world without the benefit of a final interpretative
authority. In short, it seemed to me that even I could probably milk this thing
for a career—which I have.
Looking back at the history of the CISG over the thirty-plus years since
that December 1987 conference, it is vital to remember how successful the
CISG has been in stimulating important, indeed critical, advances in so many
areas. It was Peter Schlechtriem’s extraordinary (and typically) brilliant and
creative insights into this aspect of the CISG in a keynote address at a later
Pittsburgh CISG conference1 that first dragged my sluggish mind into
considering the multifaceted perspectives needed to assess the success of the
1
Peter H. Schlechtriem, 25 Years of the CISG: An International lingua franca for Drafting Uniform
Laws, Legal Principles, Domestic Legislation and Transnational Contracts, in DRAFTING CONTRACTS
UNDER THE CISG 167 (Harry M. Flechtner et al. eds., 2008).
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Convention—from its role in creating a new lingua franca for contract law
(Peter’s wonderful insight), to stimulating careful study of the methodology
needed for producing a truly international and truly autonomous
interpretation of a uniform law text, to extraordinary advances in creating the
research infrastructure needed to support such an autonomous international
interpretation.
My slow insight into a more sophisticated way to assess the success of
the Convention was pushed forward by the person who most inspired me to
pursue this career avenue—Professor John Honnold. As anyone who had the
opportunity to meet him will testify, John was a great intellect melded with
a truly kind and beautiful soul. I admit to being fundamentally lazy, but (once
again) because of Ron Brand’s indefatigable energy in pushing forward the
most critical and intellectually challenging enterprise to which a lawyer can
be a party—figuring out how law can become global—I had the
extraordinary opportunity to meet and get to know John. John gave ominous
warnings about the “homeward trend”—the fatal danger of thinking
parochially in this enterprise aimed at creating uniform international
commercial law—but he also had great confidence in our ability to overcome
this danger and to achieve an international perspective on international legal
texts. This gave me the context to understand and appreciate Peter’s insights.
I am extremely impressed with the way the papers and presentations at
this conference are taking up the challenge inherent in Peter’s paper and
John’s warnings about the homeward trend. I am also, I admit, embarrassed
at how far you all are ahead of me on this. Your insights into the diverse ways
in which the CISG has succeeded in moving the enterprise of a functional
global commercial legal system forward—and the ways in which it could be
interpreted to make it more successful—are wonderful. But, because there is
nothing like a downer keynote speaker to sour a wonderful evening, I want
to acknowledge and focus on an aspect of the CISG that I think we all must
admit has not been as successful as we hoped: it simply is not used—or, at
least, not consciously used—to the extent needed to achieve its purpose of
significantly reducing the transactions costs associated with choice of law in
international trade, and thereby stimulating (in a healthy fashion) global
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commerce.2 Lawyers who are aware of the existence of and potential
applicability of the CISG—and that number is doubtless still not as high a
number as it should be—often advise their clients to opt out. That appears to
be true in a number of different places, and concrete evidence of a contrary
approach is slim. Drafting an effective opt out clause is tricky and thus leads
to broader application of the Convention,3 but this results in “inadvertent”
(from the parties’ perspective) application of the CISG, and that kind of
application loses some of the Convention’s most important benefits. The
failure of the Convention to be put intentionally into actual use more often
undermines the central purposes of the CISG: the reduction of international
trade transactions costs associated with choice of law issues.
And here is the thing: I believe the advice to opt out is perfectly rational.
I know it has been argued that it may be malpractice for a lawyer to advise a
client to opt-out before becoming thoroughly familiar with the advantages
and disadvantages of the CISG for the client.4 But becoming familiar enough
with the CISG to be able to draft a contract under it is an expensive
proposition; and if (heaven forbid) the transaction goes south, becoming
familiar enough with the CISG to litigate under it would be a much greater
additional expense, particularly when you factor in the (likely) greater
uncertainty in predicting CISG outcomes compared to outcomes under
alternative and longer-standing domestic law. Who will bear that expense?
Perhaps the lawyers themselves, in the form of unreimbursed time spent
learning about the CISG; perhaps the clients, if the lawyers can find a way to
pass on the extra costs of becoming familiar with the Convention. Most
likely, there will be some of both. So in my view it is perfectly accurate,
rational, and—in most cases, I believe—ethical advice to say to a client:

2
See John Coyle, The Role of the CISG in Canadian Contract Practice: An Empirical Study, 38
J.L. & COMM. 66 (Fall 2019–Spring 2020); see also Ulrich G. Schroeter, Empirical Evidence of Courts’,
Parties’ and Counsels’ Approach to the CISG, in INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE
649 (Larry A. DiMatteo ed., 2014) (This provides a comprehensive and careful discussion of the available
evidence on the use of the Convention. That study questions the evidence supporting assertions that the
CISG is not often used, and cites evidence that it is used more than generally asserted—although the
evidence for that is also, admittedly, thin.).
3
Ulrich G. Schroeter, Empirical Evidence on Courts’, Parties’ and Counsels’ Approach to the
CISG, in INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 649 (Larry A. DiMatteo ed., 2014).
4
See, e.g., id.
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If you want to use the CISG, fine. It may have advantages, or disadvantages for
you, but right now I don’t know which will be greater. I can tell you that using the
CISG will entail increased expense as compared to sticking with the applicable
law with which we are familiar. Our fees may have to be increased to cover at
least a part of our increased costs.

And I think we all know how clients would likely respond to that.
It has been argued that the reason the CISG is not used is because it is
substantively inferior to the alternatives—specifically (for U.S. parties)
inferior to the alternative of applying Article 2 of the UCC.5 I don’t buy that
explanation because I don’t think it fits the facts. I do not see non-U.S. parties
opting in to the UCC because of its substantive superiority. The only parties
I see insisting on UCC Article 2 are from the United States. The evidence I
see suggests that parties routinely prefer the domestic law with which they
are familiar, and for which their tested contract forms and models have been
drafted.6 The sunk costs of getting familiar with that law, and drafting
appropriate documents thereunder, have already been incurred. And parties
who cannot get their own already-familiar domestic law, I understand, are
not flocking to UCC Article 2 as an alternative. I understand they have tended
to opt for Swiss Law or English Law, because (in the former case) that law
(or at least the culture behind it) has the reputation of being even-handed,
“neutral,” and fair (like the Swiss), or (in the latter case) because that law has
the reputation of being well-adapted to international trade. I think the word
“reputation” is the key word here, for I have never seen yet any study
quantifying the substantive superiority of English law for international sales.
And many years ago, Ingeborg Schwenzer disabused me of the idea that

5

The CISG is a treaty whose provisions are likely to become less and less useful as time goes
on. Indeed, we predict that CISG ultimately will lose out in competition with alternative
legal regimes. The most likely competitors are prominent domestic law systems that offer
the kinds of substantive rules preferred by commercial parties. Should that prediction
materialize, then CISG would simply remain as a costly impediment to the sort of
harmonization that has occurred in the common law of contracts in the United States. In the
United States, a natural experiment with multiple common law regimes has shown that
economic and cultural forces over time produce a remarkable degree of harmonization
around substantively uniform rules of contract law.
See Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales Law, 25
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 446, 484 (2005).
6
This factor is recognized in id. at 477. Those authors also assert, however, that “[p]ersistent and
substantial opting out of the CISG . . . is likely to reflect a distaste for its substantive terms.” Id.
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Swiss sales law was substantively superior or fairer compared to other
domestic laws.
The fact is that the CISG is caught in a kind of prisoner’s or public goods
dilemma: it would benefit global commerce if the Convention was widely
known and used so that parties could spend less time and money bargaining
over choice of law, and less time becoming familiar with a foreign domestic
law if they fail to get their own law to apply. I repeat, that would reduce
transactions costs associated with choice of law issues. Those savings to
global commerce, in general, would almost surely far outweigh the start-up
costs (the costs of learning about the CISG) associated with transitioning to
the Convention. Indeed, in a previous Pittsburgh conference, Professor Ken
Lehn from Pitt’s business school contributed an economic essay that makes
a convincing case for significant transactions costs saving if the CISG
replaced the system of applying (generally) domestic sales law to
international sales transactions; he demonstrates how such savings, although
small in the case of individual transactions, can become eye-popping when
aggregated over the vast number of international sales transactions.7 Yet the
rational self-interest of individual clients (and their lawyers) leads to a
preference for opting out in favor of the law they already know—an outcome
that makes sense for each particular transaction, but which loses the
advantages to the international trading community which the CISG was
designed to produce.
The only way that I know to overcome the kind of prisoner’s or public
goods dilemma from which the CISG suffers is to be coercive. In the case of
the Convention, that means to force those engaged in international sales
transactions (as least those located in Contracting States) to apply the CISG,
and thus get past the rational calculation by individual international sales
participants that prevents the outcome best for global commerce as a whole.
In the case of the CISG that coercion would likely have involved Contracting
States being required to apply the CISG, rather than domestic sales law, to
an international transaction when their law was applicable to the transaction.
In other words, eliminate opting out in favor of familiar domestic sales law
as an alternative by forbidding the choice of a Contracting State’s domestic
sale law for an international sale. You could still give parties great

THE

7
Kenneth Lehn, The CISG: Perspectives from an Economist, in DRAFTING CONTRACTS UNDER
CISG 261 (Harry M. Flechtner et al. eds., 2008).

Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.173 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu

2019-2020]

THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE CISG

41

autonomy—they could agree to change any (or virtually any) CISG
provision—but they could not simply opt out of the CISG as applicable law
in favor of familiar domestic sales law. Eliminating that easy alternative
would, I believe, by this point have engendered widespread understanding
and use of the CISG. It thus would have forced the investment needed to
acquire knowledge of the CISG, which would have led to the socially
superior solution of widespread use of the Convention.
That coercive approach is exactly the model that was adopted for the
UCC. The UCC did not offer an alternative to existing state commercial law;
rather, it replaced that law (except in Louisiana). And this coercive
approach—which required lawyers and clients to abandon the no-longer
operative law with which they were familiar and to acquire knowledge of its
replacement—worked. By all accounts, it has increased homogeneity (even
if it failed to achieve perfect uniformity) in the sales law applicable across
the United States, and it has reduced the transactions costs of choosing law
when parties are located in different U.S. states. This is due, I believe,
primarily to the fact the easy alternative of continuing to use the sales law
with which lawyers and clients were already familiar was not available. If the
UCC had been a functionally opt-in (i.e., easy to opt-out) instrument like the
CISG—one that was a mere alternative to, rather than a replacement for,
existing commercial law—I suspect it would not have become any more used
than the CISG.
Of course, the UCC’s coercive approach had its costs. The widespread
adoption of the UCC occurred in the 1970s, and even when I went to law
school (in 1978) you could hear echoes of the wailing and gnashing of teeth
among lawyers (and, no doubt, clients) brought about by this forced
conversion to a complex and expensive-to-learn-about new commercial legal
regime. Yes, at the beginning there was resentment and extra expense for
lawyers and clients—but it worked. And it worked despite the limitations of
our federal system and the autonomy granted our states to change the text of
the uniform law and then interpret it all according to their best lights. For a
variety of reasons, mostly political necessity, the UCC adopted a flexible and
decentralized implementation approach that required the UCC be enacted by
individual states (rather than the national legislature). This approach
frequently produced non-uniform versions in state enactments. And, of
course, this implementation approach also meant there was no “Supreme
Court” for the UCC, but rather a multitude of final authorities on the meaning
of the UCC within each separate state. The UCC approach thus precluded the
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existence of a single final authority to establish the definitive meaning of the
statute. Sound familiar?8 The coercive aspects of the UCC approach
overcame those limitations. In other words, for the purpose of creating “more
uniform” law (which, after all, is the basic purpose of both the UCC and the
CISG), the coercive approach of the UCC produced the desired result: a
better-coordinated law that reduced the costs associated with choice of law
bargaining and issues because it was very widely used.
Of course, we all know—or at least we intuit—why such an approach
would not have worked with the CISG. To ask states to give up the alternative
of applying their own domestic sales law to international sales transactions,
in my opinion (and probably yours), would have sunk the Convention’s
chances for widespread ratification, because that approach would almost
certainly have significantly increased opposition to ratification of the CISG
among the international traders (and their counsel) who were the main objects
of the CISG. And the fact that the CISG eschewed that approach no doubt
explains its most notable success—widespread ratification. The reason the
coercive approach would have produced increased opposition is, I suspect,
the same as the reason for the failure of more widespread use (at least
intended use) of the CISG in actual transactions: the legal community and
their clients would not want to be forced to abandon, in international
transactions, the familiar domestic law that had worked sufficiently well up
to this point, particularly when that would have required an initial outlay of
significant additional expense for the sake of benefits that would be reaped
not exclusively by those who incurred that expense, but would be spread
across the broader international trading community. In other words, once
again, the prisoner’s or public goods dilemma.

8
The two sponsoring organizations for the UCC—the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law—attempted to counter the centrifugal tendencies of
a multitude of equally-authoritative final interpretative authorities by establishing a joint “Permanent
Editorial Board for the UCC.” The mission of that body is to “assist[] in attaining and maintaining
uniformity in state statutes governing commercial transactions by discouraging non-uniform amendments
to the UCC by the states, and by approving and promulgating amendments to the UCC when necessary.”
See Uniform Commercial Code UCC, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, https://www.ali.org/publications/
show/uniform-commercial-code/ (last visited June 16, 2019). A body with a similar mission for the
Convention—to promote a uniform interpretation of the CISG by issuing Advisory Opinions on issues of
importance under the Convention—is the CISG Advisory Council (of which the author of this paper is a
member). See CISG ADVISORY COUNCIL, https://www.cisgac.com/ (last visited June 16, 2019). The
creation of a body for the CISG with a mission akin to that of the UCC Permanent Editorial Board was
urged in John E. Murray, Jr., The Neglect of the CISG: A Workable Solution, 17 J.L. & COMM. 365 (1998).
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This situation, however, illustrates the truth of the old joke about how
many psychiatrists it takes to change a light bulb. The answer is, only one—
but the lightbulb has to want to change. The CISG’s prisoner’s/public goods
dilemma meant that, on an individual basis, the lightbulbs did not want to
change to the CISG. They might have liked everybody else to change, and
thus drive down the costs of changing, but no one wants to lead that charge:
everyone wants to be the late-arriving free-rider on the efforts of others to
learn about the CISG.
II. THE PRESENT (MERCIFULLY BRIEF)
I do not want to dwell long on the present. After all, in a moment, it will
be gone. Plus, the present is not that pleasant to talk about. But as context for
discussion of the future, the present can be important. So, a few words.
The CISG was built on a basic shared faith that increasing international
commerce, which required international cooperation and understanding,
was—with proper regulation (on which there was no doubt not a
consensus)—a good thing. I quote from the Convention’s Preamble:
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION, . . . BEING OF THE
OPINION that the adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts for the
international sale of goods and take into account the different social, economic
and legal systems would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international
trade and promote the development of international trade, HAVE AGREED AS
FOLLOWS . . . .9

That view, which was clearly a working consensus among those who
put together the Convention, justified the effort put into the Convention. It
has also acted as a guide for those charged with the task of trying to interpret
the CISG in a way that achieves its purposes. And, of course, the values
expressed in, and lying behind, the Preamble to the Convention are, at this
moment in history, questioned—in fact, I (and probably many of you) would
say they are besieged—in the United States, in Europe, and (I wouldn’t be
surprised) in much of the rest of the world (but I have to admit I am not
qualified to testify as to all that). That questioning of the values that underlie
the Convention, of course, makes the prospect of correcting what I see as the
flaw in the approach of the CISG—a lack of willingness to require the effort
9
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods pmbl., Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
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needed to make the Convention widely applied so that it can operate to
decrease the transactions costs of international sales—even more unlikely.
As far as I can see, that conclusion is just undeniable. So much for the present.
III. THE FUTURE
At this point, the proper thing to do, of course, is to assert one’s
optimism about the ability of folks of good intent, like us, to overcome these
problems. I do not want to do that—I cannot do that. Embracing optimism at
this point is, in my view, exactly what we don’t need—just as embracing
pessimism would be. What we don’t need is more leap-of-faith allegiance,
not based on looking at reality, to a wished-for or a feared outcome. Such
allegiance interferes with our ability to perceive reality as clearly and
accurately as we can, and I think we need as much accurate understanding of
reality as we can muster. I fervently believe we must continue to deepen, not
distort, our understanding of the way things actually are in order to succeed
in the enterprise of learning to live and flourish together as the human
species. In this enterprise, the CISG plays a modest but, I believe, critical
role—critical because it helps pave the way for and encourages a whole lot
of other efforts to build a functional global legal system. My skeptical attitude
toward both optimism and pessimism was well-captured by (of course) an
American stand-up comedian—the late George Carlin. The optimist, Carlin
said, sees the glass as half-full; the pessimist sees the glass as half-empty. “I
see a glass,” he said, “that’s twice as big as it needs to be.” I concur with
Carlin. And his understanding of the partially-full glass situation is the one
that might actually help us deal with that situation effectively.
Thus, I urge you (and myself) to turn away from optimism (and, equally,
pessimism) as an underlying approach to understanding the situation facing
uniform international law initiatives, and human life in general. Having said
that, let me now offer words of—well, perhaps not hope (you know, my antioptimism thing), but at least a call to invigorating action. Our hope, in fact,
lies in our ignorance. We don’t, by any means, deeply understand reality, and
we certainly don’t know with any precision what is going to happen in the
future. Isaac Newton is alleged to have said, shortly before he died: “I do not
know what I may appear to the world, but to myself I seem to have been only
like a boy playing on the seashore, and diverting myself in now and then
finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great
ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me.” I certainly am no Isaac
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DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.173 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu

2019-2020]

THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE CISG

45

Newton. You may be. But even so, that just means that even you have merely
been gathering pebbles of truth while the great ocean still remains almost
completely undiscovered. None of us knows with even the slightest certainly
how things will turn out.
So maybe uniform international law initiatives are doomed—and
perhaps, the human species as well (note how deftly I expand the
perspective). But we absolutely do not know that for a certainly. And in the
face of that uncertainty, the only rational thing to do is to bet on and work
toward the hopeful possibility. If that turns out to be futile, well we haven’t
made it any worse, and we apparently could not avoid it. But wouldn’t we all
feel a little stupid if it turned out we could have made a difference, but we
didn’t bother trying because we were depressed by the current situation. So,
let us all join hands and march bravely and energetically forward. It may be
our march is doomed to be futile—but at least the company will be good.
And who knows, perhaps our efforts will produce a glorious new paradise of
international cooperation and incredible international prosperity—or at least
a somewhat better world—than if we don’t bother. It just makes sense to
bother. Let’s do it.
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